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This paper briefly describes the organization and authority of the
French Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB). Against this
backdrop, the paper then reviews the possibilities for cooperation by the
COB with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other
foreign regulatory authorities, with particular emphasis on the two hy-
pothetical cases posed for this symposium.
1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE FRENCH REGULATORY AGENCY
1.1. Establishment of the COB
The COB is the principal entity regulating securities transactions
in France. The COB was established in 1967, modeled in large part on
the SEC. Unlike the SEC, however, the COB was also established to
encourage the development as well as the regulation of the financial
markets. Thus, to encourage the desired growth and broaden the base
of stockholders, it was necessary to enhance investor confidence in the
markets.'
The COB was created in response to abuse of French financial
markets. For example, the French markets were increasingly affected
by anonymous circulars regarding various publicly traded companies.
These circulars were distributed by persons who would then profit
from the fluctuations in market prices caused by the circulation of their
own pamphlets. Though formally under the Ministry of the Economy
* A partner in the Paris office of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton. The author
acknowledges the assistance of Douglas S. Glucroft, an associate in the Paris office of
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton and of Mrs. Marie-Claude Robert, Director of
External Relations, Commission des Ophrations de Bourse.
JURIS CLASSEUR [J. CL.], Commercial Banque et Bourse, fasc. 1200, 6-7. This
section of the JURIS CLASSEUR contains one of the most complete discussions available
of the COB that is kept current.
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and Finance, in practice the COB has a great measure of autonomy.'
The COB can hire staff outside normal civil service procedures and
rules. This ability enables the COB to recruit people most qualified for
those positions available. On the other hand, the COB is often required
to coordinate its activities and initiatives with the Chambre Syndicale
des Agents de Change (the security industry trade association sanc-
tioned by the state).
1.2. Organization of the COB
The COB is much smaller, as well as much younger, than the
SEC. In 1985, it employed ninety-nine people and had a total budget
of approximately thirty million francs, of which approximately eighty
percent was devoted to staff salaries.3 In 1986, its budget increased to
forty million francs and its staff to 110.
The COB is comprised of a chairman, four members and a repre-
sentative of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance (Commissaire
du Gouvernement). Their terms are four years, renewable once. The
chairman is chosen by the Conseil des Ministres, and the four members
are chosen by the Minister of the Economy and Finance. The four
members usually include one securities dealer, one banker, one execu-
tive from a listed company and a magistrate. Most of the staff of the
COB, headed by a general secretary, is organized into five principal
divisions. They are (1) the Inspection Division, which is responsible for
contacts with the stock exchanges, market surveillance and investiga-
tions concerning trading; (2) the Accounting Division, which conducts
investigations concerning the financial statements of any company that
is publicly traded and handles relations with auditors; (3) the Legal
Division, which receives complaints from the public with respect to
possible violations of law; (4) the Investment Division, which regulates
the activities of real estate investment companies and mutual funds; and
(5) the Information Division, which reviews the prospectuses and other
announcements published by the listed companies and which handles
the listing and delisting of securities.
2 Id.
3 1985 RAPPORT AU PRP-SIDENT DE LA RIEPUBLIQUE by the Commission des Op-
rations de Bourse, at 145-46 [hereinafter 1985 ANNUAL REPORT]; Interviews with
Marie-Claude Robert, Director of External Relations, the COB (December 3, 1986
and February 17, 1987) [hereinafter Interviews, Mrs. Robert].
" Libgration, February 5, 1987, at 17 (Interview with Mr. Yves Le Portz, chair-
man of the COB) [hereinafter Libbration]; Interviews, Mrs. Robert, supra note 3.
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1.3. The COB's Authority to Conduct Investigations
The following is a selective summary of the COB's authority and
responsibilities, with emphasis on its powers to conduct investigations
- the aspect most pertinent to a review of international cooperation.
The COB's basic mission is to protect investors and to ensure the
proper functioning of French financial markets. As such, the COB's
jurisdiction covers only companies whose securities are quoted on a
French bourse or which appear on the over-the-counter list. In 1985,
approximately 1340 issuers had securities listed on the French bourses
and more than 380 others had securities listed on over-the-counter
lists.5 On the Paris bourse, approximately 200 foreign companies' se-
curities were listed.8 For these companies, the COB is responsible for
the verification of the information provided to stockholders and the
public. It may require corrective measures with respect to deficiencies
in such information and may publish a report on its findings. It may
also act upon complaints from the public or from stockholders with
respect to the companies under its supervision. In 1985, it received 575
such complaints, and in 1986 approximately 2000.8
In order to accomplish the foregoing, the COB has broad investi-
gative powers.9 Until recently, the COB had a very small staff of inves-
5 For this and a variety of other statistics on the French stock markets, see 1985
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 173-264 and L'Annie Boursi~re 1985, published
by the French Compagnie des Agents de Change [hereinafter L'Annie Boursi~re].
I L'Ann~e Boursi~re, supra note 5, at 11. (There are bourses in seven French
cities - Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Marseilles, Nancy, Nantes and Paris.) The COB is
based in Paris, and has regional offices in Lyon and Nancy.
7The COB has developed an elaborate array of rules and procedures regarding
disclosure and solicitation, a review of which is beyond the scope of this paper.
8 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 261; Libgration, supra note 4.
9 Ordonnance no. 67-833 instituant une commission des opgrations de bourse et
relative a linformation des porteurs de valeurs mobili res et a la publict de
certaines opgrations de bourse (Ordinance No. 67-833 of September 28, 1967, creating
a stock exchange commission) Article 5, CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. 5 (74e ed.
Dalloz 1967), at 76-78 [hereinafter Ordonnance]. This Article sets forth the statutory
basis of the COB's investigative power. Its translation reads as follows:
5. In order to perform its mission, the Commission may, by means of
a specific resolution for each company, authorize its agents to obtain dis-
closure at the head offices of the companies referred to under paragraph I
of Article 3 [public companies] and in the banks, stockbrokers' offices and
premises of firms or persons whose profession is providing stockbrokers
with transactions, without contracts of employment, such materials as they
shall consider useful for the performance of their assignment, and in par-
ticular, any contracts, books, accounting documents and minute books.
Such agents may also obtain any information useful for the purposes of
their assignments from any third parties having performed transactions on
behalf of the company.
(Law No. 70-1208 of December 23, 1970). The Commission des Opgra-
tions de Bourse may, after a specific resolution, summon and question, or
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tigators. Now, the COB has seven investigators. It invokes these investi-
gative powers regularly. In 1985, for example, the COB launched
thirty-three investigations; in 1986, sixty-nine investigations were
launched."0 There are a number of areas in which the COB has spe-
cific authority to investigate. For example, the COB may investigate
alleged insider trading or stock manipulation; the COB may also inves-
tigate alleged inaccuracy or falsification in published financial state-
ments and alleged abuses in the management and activities of mutual
funds and other investment companies.
The COB has the authority to require that any piece of informa-
tion it deems useful be turned over to it from the publicly traded com-
pany or companies under investigation, including contracts, financial
statements, minute books and bookkeeping records. Banks, stockbro-
kers, and g~rants de portefeuilles and remisiers (portfolio managers
and other persons, respectively, who place orders with registered stock-
brokers) may also be required to turn over any such information that
they possess.
Persons refusing to turn over such information may be subject to
disciplinary action or criminal penalty." Persons who otherwise might
be able to claim immunity from the requirement to disclose certain in-
formation on the basis of the French law of professional secrecy may
generally not interpose a privilege on that basis in proceedings con-
cause its agents to summon and question, any person who may provide it
with information relating to matters laid before it.
Any person summoned may be assisted by counsel of his choice. The terms
and conditions of such summons and of exercise of this right shall be de-
termined by a decree. (Cf Decree No. 71-615 of July 23, 1971, art. 4).
No obligation of professional secrecy may be asserted against the commis-
sion's agents except by officers of the court [auxiliaires de justice].
The members and agents of the commission shall be bound by the rules of
professional secrecy with respect to any facts, acts and information of
which they may have been informed by reason of their offices, under the
conditions and subject to the penalties provided for under Article 378 of
the Penal Code.
(Law No. 83-1 of January 3, 1983). The duty provided under the forego-
ing paragraph shall not prevent disclosure by the Commission des Opbra-
tions de Bourse of the information which it has collected to the authorities
of other member states of the European Communities performing similar
duties and bound by the same duties of professional confidentiality.
The Commission des Opbrations de Bourse may also disclose the informa-
tion which it has collected to the authorities of other states performing
similar duties, subject to reciprocity, and provided that the appropriate
foreign authority is subject to rules of professional secrecy the same as
those in France.
10 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3 at 79; Libbration, supra note 4.
'x Ordonnance, supra note 9, art. 10.
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ducted by the COB.' 2 On the other hand, the COB and its staff may
refuse, except on court order, to provide information to others on the
grounds that such information is privileged. The COB may also, sub-
ject to obtaining an order to that effect, require that any person having
information bearing on a COB investigation come to a hearing to give
testimony.
In connection with insider trading inquiries, the COB may seek
testimony or other information from persons who effected large transac-
tions in the stock being invested or who have professional or family
affiliations with the company in question. Insider trading has been ille-
gal in France since 1970. The insider trading statute, reinforced in
1983, provides for fines and/or imprisonment. It defines insiders to in-
clude anyone who may have privileged information, such as managers,
accountants, employees, financial advisors and their spouses. 3 Such
persons are also responsible for the insider trading of their "tippees. '"'
Inside information is defined as "privileged information on the pros-
pects or situation of an issuer of securities or on the prospects for future
trading of a security."'" An insider trading investigation in 1984 re-
sulted in the COB turning over the names of six securities dealers for
disciplinary action by the Chambre Syndicale des Agents de Changes
(Chambre Syndicale). Action was to be taken against both the individu-
als and their employer.' 6
The definition of parties subject to a COB investigation is not lim-
ited by the statute and thus would encompass employees and directors
of a listed company and persons associated with subsidiaries of a pub-
licly traded company, as well as independent auditors and attorneys.
Unlike the SEC, however, the COB may investigate or recom-
mend prosecution of only corporate (and not individual) wrongdoing.
This difference has been a hallmark of the COB's activity to date. The
COB cannot prosecute violations itself, and must refer matters to the
criminal courts for prosecution. Due to the difficulty the COB has in
12 Stockbrokers are generally thought to be subject to requirements of professional
secrecy, and since 1984 it has been clear that bankers are covered by the law of profes-
sional secrecy in France. Law of January 24, 1984 (Journal Officiel [J.O.], January
25, 1984). Regarding the impact of the law of professional secrecy on international
cooperation, see infra text accompanying notes 26 and 27, and Ordonnance, supra
note 9.
13 The original statute was strengthened with the Law No. 83-1 of January 3,
1983 (J.O. January 4, 1983), which was incorporated into the Ordonnance, supra
note 9, as art. 10-1 [hereinafter Art. 10-1]. For a brief discussion, see R. ROBLOT,
TRAIT- ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 96-98 (1986).
14 Art. 10-1, supra note 13.
15 Id.
16 1984 RAPPORT AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE by the Commission des
Opbrations de Bourse, at 81.
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investigating violations by individuals, it is not able to refer a large
number of such cases. In 1986, only three cases were referred to the
courts for prosecution. This small number is partly due to budgetary
and staffing constraints.17 The cases which the COB does turn over are
normally very solid, and the COB, after reference, continues to cooper-
ate in the prosecution of the case. In criminal cases, the court is re-
quired to seek the COB's opinion when conducting a prosecution of
alleged insider trading or market fraud. The president of the COB can
also, since its governing statute was amended in December 1985,"8 seek
judicial orders and injunctions to compel those violating the law to cor-
rect or cease their illegal conduct.
This year, the French Government has appointed a special com-
mission to draft a code of ethics for securities brokers and fiduciaries in
light of the growing importance of the bourse in France. 9 Violations of
this code, if adopted as regulations by the COB, could then serve as a
basis for civil injunctive actions in securities fraud referred by the COB
to the Tribunaux de grande instance pursuant to its authority under
the December 1985 amendments.
As indicated above, the COB can only act indirectly against indi-
viduals by reporting to the public prosecutor any violations of criminal
law of which it becomes aware. For example, the COB could report
instances of inaccuracy or falsification of a publicly traded company's
Note d' Information (prospectus) or other documents distributed to the
investing public. The manager and auditors of a company may be held
criminally liable for such falsehoods.
The foregoing highlights another important difference between the
ways in which the SEC and COB operate. The COB cannot, as indi-
cated above, punish violations short of criminal prosecution. The COB
has no authority to bring administrative or other civil proceedings
(where the proof requirements would be easier to meet) or to invoke
the broad range of remedies available to the SEC. French criminal
courts are reluctant to convict persons unless there is evidence of a na-
ture comparable to the American threshold of proof "beyond a reasona-
ble doubt." Moreover, the French system of criminal justice leaves no
17 Interviews, Mrs. Robert, supra note 3.
18 The other aspect of the December 1985 amendments broadened the COB's au-
thority to promulgate regulations governing (i) all securities markets (and not limited to
the stock market) and (ii) professional standards for broker-dealers, investment advisors
and others in the securities industry. See Law of December 14, 1985, Article 31 (J.O.
December 15, 1985). See generally 2 A. JOLY, DICTIONNAIRE DU DROIT DES
SOc -TLS ANONYMES, Commission des Opgrations de Bourse (a permanent loose-leaf
service on corporations).
19 Les Echos de la Bourse, February 18, 1987, at 1, 18.
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room for plea bargaining in exchange for cooperation with the investi-
gation. The COB may bring suspected wrongdoing by brokers to the
attention of the Chambre Syndicale for disciplinary action, but the
Chambre Syndicale, as a trade association, is often protective of its
members and thus reluctant to prosecute vigorously alleged violations
brought to its attention by the COB.
While the COB obtains convictions in the large majority of crimi-
nal cases it refers, a recent insider trading case provides a striking ex-
ample of the risk posed by exclusive recourse to criminal jurisdiction.2"
The case involved two individuals who had access to information con-
cerning the execution by a state owned company, Thomson C.S.F., of a
four-billion dollar military electronics contract with Saudi Arabia. The
two individual defendants made massive purchases of Thomson stock.
One of the two defendants, a high level Defense Ministry official, at-
tended meetings on January 12 and 13, 1984, at which the execution of
the contract was discussed. Apparently this question was discussed at
the start of the meetings before the individual, who arrived late, was in
attendance. Nonetheless, on January 12, 1984 at 2:00 p.m., immedi-
ately after the close of the meeting, the individual placed an order for
between 5,000 and 6,000 shares of Thomson C.S.F. and on January 13
purchased a total of 6,570 shares of Thomson for a total price of FFr
1,822,500. At the same time, the individual cancelled a standing order
he had to sell Thomson stock on a certain date. In this particular situa-
tion the court held that despite the "troubling coincidence" between the
status of the contract and the transactions on the market, there re-
mained a doubt as to the reason for the purchases and the court thus
acquitted the individual in question. This decision was recently con-
firmed by the Cour d'Appel de Paris (Paris Court of Appeals).
The surprising result in the Thomson case, besides highlighting
the rigorous burden of proof that a criminal court will require of the
prosecution, may also rest on a misinterpretation of the French insider
trading law. According to the weight of the decided cases and scholarly
commentary, the law does not require direct proof of a certain casual
link between the trading and the information. As long as a person con-
sidered to be an insider by the statute has nonpublic information re-
garding an issuer and thereby trades in securities of that issuer, it is
presumed that he does so on the basis of such information, and he is
thus generally found to have violated the statute.2
2 Judgment of May 13, 1986, Trib. gr. inst. (court of original jurisdiction), Fr.,
Gazette du Palais [G.P.], at 459.
2 For a discussion of the French insider trading statute and the decided cases, see
Duccouloux-Favard, Le D9lit d'Initig, Dix ans de jurisprudence et d'activitg de la
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2. LIMITATIONS ON FRENCH COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN
AGENCIES
The COB faces two formidable obstacles in its efforts to cooperate
with its counterparts from other countries. The most important is
clearly the blocking statute, which is discussed in the presentation pa-
per (Greene Paper) prepared by my Washington colleagues,22 and the
presentation paper by Harvey Pitt and his colleagues (Pitt Paper).
2 3
The second obstacle is the one imposed by the limited scope of the
COB's jurisdiction and powers in France as summarized above; the
COB supervises only companies that are publicly traded on a bourse or
over-the-counter market. It is thus highly unlikely that a subsidiary,
such as the hypothetical case in the Greene Paper, would be within the
COB's jurisdiction.
The effects of the blocking statute have been alleviated to some
extent by the promulgation of an exception in 1983 that permits the
COB to cooperate with foreign regulatory bodies as long as the foreign
agency is subject to similar confidentiality requirements as is the COB
and as long as such foreign agency agrees to reciprocate when the COB
requests assistance.2 4 The enactment of the 1983 exception was the re-
sult of lobbying by the COB.25 For the COB, the exception was an
essential prerequisite to any cooperation with foreign securities regula-
tors, and its success is illustrative of its strong commitment to interna-
tional cooperation. While the 1983 exception may permit certain assis-
tance with respect to information that the COB already has in its
possession, it does not explicitly authorize the COB to undertake an
investigation to obtain information requested by a foreign regulator.
Moreover, in order to be in a position to benefit from the exception, the
COB would be required to have entered into an agreement with a cor-
responding foreign agency such as the SEC, to guarantee reciprocity
and secrecy. Finally, under French law there is no other agency or
authority from which the COB may seek assistance to determine
whether French residents have violated any provisions of foreign laws;
thus, in the insider trading hypothetical posed in the Pitt Paper, the
COB would not be able to act as the SEC's proxy in France.
Commission des Operations de Bourse, G.P., September 29, 1984 and J. CL., Pgnal
Annexes - Bourse de Valeurs, fasc. 1(B).
22 See Greene, Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities Market,
this issue, pp. 349-51.
22 See Pitt, Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities Market, this
issue, pp. 411-13.
2' Ordonnance, supra note 9.
21 See, e.g., Lee, Robert, Hirsch & Pollack, Secrecy Laws and Other Obstacles to
International Cooperation, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 63, 69-70 (1982).
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Investigators from a foreign regulatory agency will also be con-
fronted with the French law of professional secrecy, which makes it a
criminal offense for certain professionals, including stockbrokers, inde-
pendent accountants and bankers, to divulge information concerning
their clients."6 (Members of the COB are themselves subject to the law
of professional secrecy.) This criminal statute will prevent foreign se-
curities law investigators from obtaining much useful evidence from the
persons most likely to have the information required. Although the pre-
cise contours of what constitutes a "secret" for purposes of the statute is
sometimes not susceptible to an easy answer, in general, any fact con-
cerning a client that is not otherwise in the public domain is considered
to be a secret under French law, and accordingly, professionals will be
likely to err on the side of being cautious in what they disclose to inves-
tigators. Under French law, the client's consent to disclosure will not
automatically absolve the professional of criminal liability; the cases are
divided on this point. If the COB were conducting the investigation,
bankers and other professionals covered by Article 378 of the Code P-
nal would not be able to claim a privilege from testifying on the
grounds that they would have to disclose their clients' secrets.21
Unless the COB were conducting an investigation into the same
matters as those of the foreign agency, almost all information the COB
would already have in its possession, even with respect to a publicly
traded company, would be publicly available and recourse to the COB
might not prove useful. The COB, however, has been able to be helpful
on numerous occasions by providing information to foreign counter-
parts that, although theoretically "publicly available," is nevertheless
difficult to gather. For example, the COB has on occasion been asked
to determine the name and address corresponding to a particular tele-
phone number that appeared on documents the SEC was able to sub-
poena in the United States. The COB has also been asked to provide
public information on French residents that it has compiled from dispa-
rate sources for its own files. The Pitt Paper refers to the usefulness of
this type of information to the SEC.
28
Another type of cooperation was illustrated by an SEC investiga-
tion in 1985.29 The SEC was investigating the United States subsidiary
of a French company. Although the COB declined to give effect to the
28 CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 378. See supra note 12.
27 See supra notes 9 and 12.
28 See Pitt, supra note 23, pp. 428-29.
29 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 129. The COB receives approxi-
mately three or four requests a year for cooperation from the SEC, and an average of
one a year from a foreign agency other than the SEC. Interviews, Mrs. Robert, supra
note 3.
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SEC's waiver-by-conduct position (a position the COB still resists), it
did arrange for meetings between the SEC and representatives of the
French company in question under the aegis of the French Ministry of
Foreign Relations. The COB, in the context of international coopera-
tion, has the authority to arrange for witnesses to give voluntary testi-
mony to foreign securities regulators at the Ministry. This arrangement
has been possible on a number of occasions, though it should be noted
that the process which requires adherence to international conventions
(e.g., Letters Rogatory through the Hague Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters)3" and coordina-
tion of various French agencies concerned, can be slow and laborious.
The COB has, after consultation with the Ministry of Justice,
suggested a new tack to the SEC for an investigation that was ongoing
as of February 1987, that, if applied to the two hypothetical cases,
might result in significantly greater assistance to the SEC investigation.
The COB has suggested that the SEC invoke a 1927 French law gov-
erning extradition. Among its provisions is a section that authorizes, in
criminal proceedings brought abroad, the gathering of evidence and
taking of testimony in France. Such requests would have to be for-
warded via diplomatic channels to the French Ministry of Justice. Pro-
cedural provisions of the law permit prompt action in an "emergency."
It is as yet uncertain whether this new avenue will prove fruitful for
the SEC. A translation of Articles 32 and 33 of the 1927 French law
states:
32. If in criminal proceedings brought abroad, the for-
eign government considers disclosure of evidence or docu-
ments in the possession of the French authorities to be neces-
sary, the request shall be made through diplomatic channels.
It shall be granted unless there are specific objections, and
subject to the obligation to return the evidence and docu-
ments as soon as possible.
33. If a foreign government considers the personal ap-
pearance of a witness residing in France to be necessary in
criminal proceedings, the French government, having re-
ceived the subpoena through diplomatic channels, shall invite
him to comply with the request.
However, the subpoena shall be received and forwarded
to the witness subject to the condition that the witness may
not be prosecuted or imprisoned with respect to facts or con-
SO Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
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victions prior to his appearance."1
Although the COB has done so with considerably less frequency
than the SEC, the COB has on occasion asked the SEC for assistance.
In a recent instance, the COB asked the SEC to cooperate in an investi-
gation of a fraud organized in France but originating in the United
States. This fraud involved the passing off of non-negotiable securities
31 Law of March 10, 1927, Article 696, CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR.
PEN.] art. 696 (1986-1987). Other relevant paragraphs are translated as follows:
9. Any request for extradition shall be sent to the French government
through diplomatic channels, accompanied by either a judgment of convic-
tion, including a contumax or default judgment, or an instrument of crimi-
nal procedure expressly ordering or having the automatic effect of in-
dicting the accused before a criminal court, or a warrant of arrest or any
other instruction issued by the judicial authorities, provided that the latter
instruments contain a specific indication of the facts with respect to which
they are issued, and the date thereof.
The aforesaid clauses must be produced in original or notarized copies.
The requesting government shall produce at the same time copies of the
statutes applicable to the prosecuted action. It may attach a statement of
the facts of the matter.
10. The request for extradition, after verification of the documents,
shall be forwarded with the records, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
the Ministry of Justice, which shall ascertain the lawful character of the
request and proceed thereupon as required by law.
19. In the event of emergency and upon a direct request from the
judicial authority of the requesting country, the public prosecutor may, by
notice given by mail or any other faster means of transmission leaving a
written record, or equivalent, of the existence of one of the documents
specified by Article 9, order the temporary arrest of the foreigner.
Valid notice of the request shall also be transmitted at the same time
through diplomatic channels, by mail, telegraph or any other means of
transmission leaving a written record, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The public prosecutor shall give notice of such arrest to the Ministry of
Justice and senior public prosecutor.
30. In the event of non-political criminal proceedings in a foreign
country, letters rogatory issued by the foreign authority shall be received
through diplomatic channels and forwarded to the Ministry of Justice as
provided for under Article 10 herein. Waivers shall be carried out if ap-
propriate and in accordance with French law.
In emergencies, letters rogatory may be communicated directly between
the judicial authorities of the two countries. In such case, failing notice
given through diplomatic channels to the French Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs by the relevant foreign government, direct communication between
the two countries' judicial authorities shall not be effective.
31. In the event of prosecution abroad, if a foreign government consid-
ers to be necessary service of a procedural instrument or judgment on an
individual residing on such territory, the document shall be forwarded in
the manner provided for under Articles 9 and 10 accompanied, if appro-
priate, by a French translation. Service shall be made personally at the
request of the public prosecutor's office by a qualified agent. The original
copy evidencing service shall be returned to the requesting government by
the same means.
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as negotiable securities to small investors. The SEC assisted with the
COB investigation in the United States.
Within the European Economic Community (EEC), such coopera-
tion has been fostered by the EEC Code of Conduct32 (Code) that has
resulted in the exchange of information among securities regulators as
long as confidentiality rules are respected. The Code was published in
1977, but it does not have the force of law as would an EEC directive.
The Code sets forth as general principles that complete and accurate
information be provided to investors in member states of the EEC, that
all investors be treated equally, and that the securities laws of each
member state be respected. In order to put the Code into practice, the
member states have established a joint committee to coordinate their
actions in applying the Code. Since 1977, the EEC Council of Minis-
ters has promulgated a number of directives regarding securities regula-
tion, notably concerning listing and delisting criteria and public report-
ing requirements for listed companies. The EEC Commission has also
proposed other directives governing the contents and review of prospec-
tuses. As of March 1987, the EEC Commission was expected to submit
to the Council of Ministers a proposed regulation prohibiting insider
trading.
3. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
The COB has stated that the establishment of full cooperation
with the SEC will only be realized with the signature of a bilateral
agreement which specifies the manner in which such cooperation would
be carried out. Such an accord is currently being negotiated, and the
COB hopes that it and the SEC can reach agreement this year. The
COB expects that it will closely track the United States-United King-
dom agreement partly because the COB intends to negotiate an accord
with the British Government as well.
The procedures to be put in place by such an agreement would
include furnishing (1) documents supporting the request for informa-
tion, (2) a precise statement of the requested information, (3) a state-
ment of the provisions of the requesting state's laws or regulations that
are alleged or believed to have been violated, and (4) a description of
the use that will be made of the requested information.
Cooperation under such agreement, in the COB's view, would be
subject to the condition that agents making the investigations would be
bound by the rules of confidentiality to which the COB's own agents
are bound. In addition, the authority providing such information would
32 20 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 212) 1 (1977).
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have the power to veto any use of the information which would be a
use different from that set forth in the original request from the other
authorities. The SEC, of course, might not be able to guarantee abso-
lute confidentiality."3 The legal restrictions on absolute confidentiality
in the United States, from the COB's perspective, however, would not
block cooperation as long as the SEC promised to keep information
confidential within the legal limits, and agreed to send all documents
obtained from the COB back to France. After a bilateral agreement
was in place, the COB might ask the SEC to obtain an exemption from
its disclosure obligations under United States law, but such an exemp-
tion would not be a condition precedent to reaching agreement. The
bilateral agreement would also require that the COB have the exclusive
power to conduct any investigation in France as requested by the SEC.
The SEC would not be able to act directly in France.
4. CONCLUSION
In sum, for France, the 1983 exception legislation provides author-
ity to the COB to provide certain information. A bilateral agreement
such as that which the COB has proposed to the SEC will finally give
full effect to the 1983 legislation and will serve the additional purpose
of setting forth the precise terms and conditions of such exchanges of
information.
The COB has also been playing an increasingly active role in the
management of the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO) and similar agencies. The COB has endorsed resolu-
tions calling upon all securities authorities to provide reciprocal assis-
tance relating to market oversight and fraudulent transactions and to
name a contact person to handle requests for such assistance.
In the two hypothetical cases offered for this conference, the COB
would not be able to render the full assistance that the SEC would
require. The COB could, however, help informally to arrange for vol-
untary testimony, and act as a go-between for the SEC with other de-
partments of the French government. The French law on extradition
may provide a new avenue for cooperation with the SEC. France is
negotiating with the United States a bilateral agreement on securities
cooperation that will reinforce the COB's information gathering
possibilities.
" See Greene, supra note 22, p. 333 at n.26; p. 370.
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